Budgetary pluralism of Russian Authorities by Kurlyandskaya, Galina
1BUDGETARY PLURALISM OF RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES
By Galina Kurlyandskaya
This paper raises an issue of inconsistency of the RF budgetary legislation with the federal
legislation on local governments and the current practice of organization of sub-national
governments within Russian regions. The paper analyses the existing budgetary and governance
system of the Russian Federation and shows that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the
number of governance tiers and the number of tiers of the budgetary system in the Russian
Federation. While the RF budgetary and tax legislation grants budgetary rights only to the federal
government, regional governments and one level of local governments. However the actual number
of sub-national government levels in Russia varies from 2 to 4. Depending on the number of tiers of
sub-national governments, Russian regions can be grouped into four categories. Federal legislation
leaves local governments with the very limited (if any) budgetary rights. Having little legal rights
local governments start to enforce the informal power over taxpayers and electorate. The author’s
goal is to show the necessity of amending the current federal legislation by granting the localities
the right to form one more level of sub-national government which could be assigned with the
adequate responsibilities (based on subsidiarity principle), with the right to raise revenues adequate
to these responsibilities. The new system must provide for accountability of all sub-national
governments to their constituencies through the election procedure. The paper also shows the
existing limitations that currently do not permit sub-national governments to enjoy actual
independence in decision making on budgeting and revenue raising and thus to provide public
services in the most efficient way.
21. Participants to Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Russian Federation
There is no problem in identifying participants in intergovernmental fiscal relations, where such
relations are built between the federal center and Federation subjects (Russian regions). There exists
one to one correspondence between these two levels of government and two levels. The relations
between these two levels are governed by budgetary and tax legislation of the Federation.
As regards intergovernmental relations at the sub-federal level, the situation there is different.
Federal legislation that has to deal with intergovernmental fiscal relations between bodies of local
self-government and bodies of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation provides no
straightforward guide to which bodies of government may play the role of direct counterparts of
subjects of the Federation in intergovernmental fiscal relations within regions. Federal tax and
budget legislation as well as general principles of organization of local self-government enjoying
the status of a federal law allow different candidates to compete for that role.
The RF federal legislation provides for three tiers of the budgetary system within Russia and
accordingly there are three levels of participants in intergovernmental fiscal relations. The Law on
General Principles of Organization of Local Self-government in the Russian Federation prohibits
the subordination of one municipal settlement to another.
Still the federal tax legislation provides that the number of levels of the budget system in subjects of
the Federation may exceed the number of the government levels (at least representative branches of
government), meaning that no one-to-one correspondence exists between levels of government and
levels of intra-regional budgetary system. In other words, the legislation admits of the existence of
higher and lower local budgets: budget of a municipal settlement having a representative branch of
government and budgets of populated areas within its jurisdiction having no representative branch
of government. The Law on General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-government in the
Russian Federation refers to those sub-municipal budgets as expense budgets: “Local budgets may
include expense budgets of certain populated areas and territories that are not municipal settlements
(see Article 35, paragraph 3). It makes no fundamental difference: for execution of such expense
budgets higher level budgets direct revenues to lower level budgets, making expense budgets a
variety of budget. Besides, the federal legislation provides no definition of an expense budget. As
regards bodies of local self-government of sub-municipal territories, the law expressly provides for
that they may be set up in any territory of whatever population size, with the regional legislation
assigning territory only to municipal settlements.
32. How many levels of government are there in the Russian Federation?
Let us try to figure out how many levels of government exist in the Russian Federation and how
differ their budgetary rights. To start with we have to identify differences in the degree of freedom
of budgetary systems of different levels of government.
Let’s compare different levels of government from budgetary rights’ perspective.
2.1. Fedral level
We’ll start from the top. The Federal Government forms and executes the federal budget. What
makes the federal government different from other levels of government is that sources of revenues
and spending functions are established exclusively in the legislation of the same level, i.e. federal.
Therefore when federal bodies of government are faced with the task of bringing projected
expenditures in conformity with projected revenues they enjoy abundant choices such as:
1. establishing what taxes are to be used (abolished), expanding (reducing) the tax base
and/or increasing (decreasing) applicable rates of existing taxes without any limitations;
2. debt issuing and attracting borrowings;
3. cutting down (increasing) expenditures1.
2.2. Regional level
The next level of government – subjects of the Federation (regional administrations) – form and
execute regional budgets. It is typical of the regional governments that most (if not all) of their
revenue sources and a considerable portion of spending are determined by the federal government.
Hence, regional governments are constrained to as many as the following choices for providing
balance between their planned revenues and expenditures:
                                                
1 Strictly speaking, one more way of revenue generating resorted to extensively in Russia by all
levels of government is deriving revenues from the use of owned state and municipal property.
However, earnings from business or commercial activities shall not become an end in themselves.
That this source of budget revenues has become so popular in Russia, including at regional and
local levels, is one more proof of that governments are in lack of other material independent sources
of budget revenues.
41. adopting (repealing) of taxes permanently assigned by the federal tax legislation to
regional level; increasing (reducing) regional tax rates within the range established in the
federal tax legislation;
2. debt issuing and attracting borrowings within the limits imposed by the federal
legislation;
3. reducing (increasing) expenditures within the limits established by the federal
legislation2;
4. receiving transfers from the higher level budget.
Here we see a significant difference between budgetary rights of regional governments and the
federal center. Still all subjects of the Federation enjoy equal rights in terms of choices available to
them for balancing their budgets. When forming their budget proposals, even Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan (which used to enjoy fiscal privileges given to them as an exception by the federal
government) have to choose from the same set of alternatives as do other regions.
However, regional authorities in the Russian Federation have either a single-tier or a double-tier
structure. The latter is normally established in regions where local governments are formed at the
level of small towns and villages. The second tier of regional government in this case is purely
executive and is appointed by the regional “center”. However, for convenience’s sake of
functioning of remote territorial subdivisions of a regional government they are assigned with what
may be called as a budget. Sources of revenues and spending items for such “budgets” are usually
determined from the top, causing one to regard them as expense budgets or strict financial plan.
Thus, the existence of a double-tier regional government has lead to emergence of an extra level of
the budget system and one more category of participants in intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Regions with a double-tier structure of regional administrations prefer not to provide
intergovernmental transfers directly to local governments. They rather delegate this function to their
territorial subdivisions that will then distribute them among local governments under their
supervision. In so doing they are running the risk of violating the Budget Code’s principle of
uniformity of approach to local governments in intergovernmental relations.
                                                
2 Limitations on expenditure cuts are dictated by a big number of federal mandates, with no
limitations established in the legislation vis-a-vis expenditure increases.
52.3. Local level-I
The federal legislation establishing the foundations of fiscal relations between regional and local
governments applies only to relations between a subject of the Federation and just one level of local
authorities. In fact there are regions where local governments represent two tiers. This happens due
to various reasons and we will analyze them later. Whether regional authorities recognize the
second tier of local governments or not is left exclusively to discretion of subjects of the Federation.
If there existed only one tier of local governments, fiscal rights assigned to them in the federal
legislation would have enabled all localities to balance their revenues and expenditures by:
1. introducing (repealing) taxes assigned by the federal tax legislation to local taxes;
increasing/reducing rates of local taxes within the range set by the federal tax legislation;
expanding/reducing the base and/or increasing/reducing rates of certain local taxes
without any limitations3;
2. borrowings within the limits prescribed by the federal and regional legislation;
3. increasing/reducing expenses within the limits prescribed by the federal and regional
legislation;
4. receiving transfers from regional budgets.
Thus, regional and local authorities would have enjoyed the same degree of fiscal autonomy in
forming their budgets.
2.4. Local level-II
Can local budgets have lower levels? The actual practice has shown that depending on the type of
settlement where local self-government was formed, preferences of local authorities, and
availability of qualified managerial personnel financial relations in the territory under local
authorities’ jurisdiction may fall into either of the following patterns:
1. All budgetary funds of a municipality are accumulated on one budgetary account, with
expenditure discretion vested in the “central” body of the executive branch of local
government.
                                                
3 A number of local taxes to be abolished after introduction of the sales tax.
62. All budgetary funds of a municipality are accumulated on one budgetary account, with
fixed budgetary sums disbursed to sub-municipal subdivisions of local administrations
for financing their spending within narrowly prescribed spending items.
3. Sub-municipal subdivisions of local administrations are assigned sharing rates of taxes
yielding revenue to a body of local self-government of a municipal level. Spending of
those revenues is narrowly constrained by prescriptions of the “central” body of local
self-government. In case of below-the-target or surplus collections of taxes expenditures
can be reduced/increased upon approval by the “central” bodies of local self-
government.
4. Territorial subdivisions of local administrations are assigned rates of taxes yielding
revenue to a body of local self-government. Territorial subdivisions of local
administrations enjoy greater choices in terms of how total revenues collected in their
territories will be allocated among spending items.
In practice “sub-municipal” budget accounts of type 2 are customarily referred to as a fixed
financial plan imposed by the upper administration, whereas type 3 and type 4 accounts are all the
same called local budgets. Apparently, in case of a fixed financial plan no budgetary rights are
assigned, while sub-municipal budgets can at least reduce/increase expenditures and receive
transfers.
“Sub-local” or “sub-municipal” budgets of territorial subdivisions of local administrations are
normally executed by appointed officials from among local bodies of government. However, some
of the regions are in the process of forming local bodies of government appointed by election within
territories already administered by local self-governments. Such newly set up bodies of power
usually fail to acquire full budgetary rights inherent in local bodies of government and at best have
to content themselves with type 3 or type 4 budget or else continue to be on a fixed financial plan.
Notably, even where a municipal settlement with budgetary rights is formed at the level below raion
there can nevertheless be sub-municipal budgets/financial plan within such municipalities. For
example, if a municipality is a sel’soviet (village council) or a rural district, every constituent
village of such a council may have a separate budget (budgetary estimate).
Interestingly, in a number of regions with local self-governments formed at the level of large cities
and raions and with sub-municipal governments with limited budgetary rights formed within such
municipalities regional authorities are trying to intervene in the relations between municipal and
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entitled to interfere in their relations with municipalities, they can also bring influence to bear on
intergovernmental fiscal relations that develop beyond their immediate reach.
3. Types of sub-national governments in Russia
Composition of sub-regional governments in different regions of Russia can take many forms,
subject to local traditions and priorities of regional leaders, such variety being allowed by (or at
least not explicitly conflicting) the Russian legislation. The sorts of patterns that may appear here
are:
I. Formation of local governments at the level of cities and raions
Municipalities are for the most part formed at the level of larger cities reporting to the regional
government and of raions (smaller cities are included into raions). Their financial relations with
bodies of government of a Federation subject (such as the size of transfers and sharing rates of
regulating taxes) are determined directly by bodies of regional government. This kind of pattern is
typical of most subjects of the Federation. On the sub-raion level these local governments usually
create its divisions as sub-local executive bodies to bring into life the decisions taken by the upper
elected government. These divisions may open their bank accounts but these accounts are credited
and debited according to the upper municipal government’s plan.
II. Sub-raion principle of formation of local bodies of government
Municipal settlements are formed at the level of settlements of any size, including large and small
cities and rural districts (“sel’soviets”) alike.
 According to Article 1 of the Federal Law on General Principles of Organization of Local Self-
government in the Russian Federation the major criteria to classify a locality as belonging to
municipal settlements are: a) appointment of bodies of power by election, b) availability of
municipal property and c) independent budget. With the lines along which intergovernmental fiscal
relations are organized today whereby regional and local levels have to continuously agree their
budget figures, the existence of numerous subjects of intergovernmental fiscal regulation makes the
system prohibitively complicated. The experience in dealing with subjects of the Federation
suggests that where municipalities are formed at levels below raions, regional governments are very
reluctant to recognize them as participants in intergovernmental fiscal relations, preferring a direct
calculation of financial aid for them. As noted earlier, with this structure of local bodies of
government regional administrations normally form a second tier of the executive branch of
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Financial relationships between localities and the region are determined directly by bodies of
government of a Federation subject but more often the relationship between them may not be direct
but established through appropriate territorial subdivisions. Importantly, the above model can be
found in its pure form only in a few Federation subjects. One and most typical case in point is
Tyumen oblast where all of the 295 municipalities formed on the basis of sub-raion principle have
independent budgets and build their relationships with the oblast either directly or, in certain cases,
through raion’s territorial subdivisions of the regional administration.
III. “Double-layer cake” or “matryoshka”  model
However, in their quest for simplicity most of the Federation subjects have taken a different
approach, potential scenarios that can be identified here being such as the following:
1. Regional bodies of government initiate the creation of an intermediate level of local
bodies of government at raion level, the result being that bodies of local self-government
are simultaneously formed at the level of raions and cities reporting to the regional
government (referred to as level I of local governments) and in all constituent populated
areas such as small towns, rural districts, districts within cities reporting to the regional
government (level II of local governments). Hence, the sum total of jurisdictions
constituting “municipalities” of the second tier forms the territory of a “municipality” of
the first tier.
Financial relations between regional authorities and level-I local government are determined in a
direct fashion. Financial relations between regional authorities and level-II local government are
established through level-I local government. Therefore, distribution of grants and regulating taxes
received from the regional budget, among budgets of level-II local government is the responsibility
of level-I local government. Such a system of local bodies of government can be encountered only
in a few subjects of the Federation, in particular in Astrakhan oblast.
2. Regional bodies of government refuse to recognize bodies of local self-government as
being full-fledged participants in intergovernmental fiscal relations. In so doing they
delegate their intergovernmental fiscal regulation powers to those “traditionally” formed
bodies of local self-government from whose territory sub-raion municipal entities have
spun off. In this scenario “traditional” municipalities are termed as level-one municipal
settlements, while sub-raions are referred to as level-two municipal settlements. Thus,
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“municipal settlements” as incorporations, although failing to fully encompass them.
Financial relationships between regional authorities and level-I local governments are directly
determined by the former, whereas those between the region and level-two local governments are
partially determined by the former but primarily by level-I local governments, in conflict with the
Law on the General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-government ruling out
subordination of one municipal settlement to another.
The above model of organization of local self-government is rather common, typical cases in point
being Vladimir and Moscow regions.
Let us see whether all of the above-mentioned types of local governments enjoy equal fiscal rights.
Clearly, the municipalities described by base models of type I and II enjoy all heretofore mentioned
budgetary rights of local bodies of government. The only problem in building fiscal relations in
regions with local governments set up at the level below raions is lack of appropriate information
required for objective and well-reasoned decision-making vis-a-vis distribution of financial
resources to municipalities by way of fiscal regulation. The chief cause of such lacuna is that
information is collected by territorial branches of federal agencies (State Committee for Statistics
and the Ministry for Taxes and Duties), using a traditional (aggregated) administrative and
territorial division for grouping those data together.
The situation with the “double-layer cake” model of local governments and, hence, local budgets
described earlier in paragraphs 1 and 2 is somewhat different. With this type of structure no equality
can be ensured between “parent” and “subsidiary” local governments.
It stands to reason that one and the same local tax cannot be introduced in one and the same
territory by two different bodies of government. By the same token, a taxpayer cannot be made to
pay twice a full amount of one and the same tax to two different budgets. At the same time, by
establishing a distinction between revenue sources of different layer-municipalities as prescribed in
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the Law on the General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-government4 a subject of the
Federation will inevitable put them in an inequitable position. The outcome of such distinction may
be either that the list of local taxes will be divided into two (or more) parts, each body of local self-
government receiving the right to levy taxes only from the resulting partial list, or that authority to
introduce the complete list of local taxes will be delegated to just one of the levels of local self-
government that will establish rates at which local revenue sources are to be shared by lower
budgets or finance directly cities and towns located in their jurisdictions (in accordance with
expense budgets). It is the latter approach that is normally taken in practice.
Fiscal rights of local governments that are not authorized to introduce local taxes leave them only
the following choices for balancing their budgets:
1. borrowings within the limits set by the federal and regional legislation;
2. reduction (increase) of expenses within the limits set by the federal and regional
legislation;
3. transfers from higher level budgets.
IV. Local governments having no budgetary power
The list of possible scenarios of “fight” waged by regional authorities against mushrooming bodies
of local self-government set out in the previous section is not still complete. Given below are two
more commonly used options which actually eliminate the budgetary power of local government
even with the elected representative and executive bodies:
1. Regional authorities represented by their territorial subdivisions unilaterally assume or,
actually, retain what used to be their functions to levy local taxes and form local budgets
within territories under their jurisdiction. As a result municipal bodies of government
execute expense budgets assigned to them assuming responsibility to their citizenry
neither for how revenues are formed nor for how those revenues are spent.
                                                
4 «Where within the boundaries of a municipal settlement (other than a city) there are other
municipal settlements, the terms of competence of municipal settlements, municipal assets and
revenue sources of local budgets shall be delineated by the regional legislation or, in respect of
municipal settlements within a city, by the city Charter ” (Article 6.3).
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2. Regional authorities represented by their territorial subdivisions officially and
“voluntarily appoint” themselves to perform functions, delegated to them by bodies of
local self-government, of establishing local taxes and forming local budgets in territories
within their jurisdictions, with the same outcome.
Expropriation of budgetary rights of bodies of local self-government has been taking place in an
increasingly large number of Federation subjects. Novosibirsk oblast and Karachai-Circassian
Republic are typical examples of the third and fourth scenarios respectively.
In regions building their relations with municipal settlements along either of the above lines bodies
of local self-government enjoy full-scale rights only in cities directly reporting to the region.
Governments in the rest of municipalities, although formally appointed by election, are deprived of
their chief attribute: capacity to independently draft and execute their budgets. Concurrently,
budgetary rights are assigned for unintended purpose to the executive territorial subdivisions of
regional administrations that are not directly accountable to the citizenry for whom they make
decisions on taxation and provision of public services.
Fig. 1 exhibits possible organizational structures of sub-federal bodies of government. Table 1
groups Federation subjects under those structures.
FIG.1 TYPES OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN RUSSIA
MODEL I
Local self-governments
in cities and raions
MODEL II
Local self-governments
on a sub-raion level
MODEL III
“Double-layer cake”
model of local self-
government
MODEL IV
Local self-government
having no budgetary
rights (besides larger
cities)
Regional government Regional government Regional government Regional government
Local self-governments
(in cities & raions)
with budgetary rights
Local bodies of
regional government
(in raions)
with no budgetary
rights
Local self-
governments
(in raions)
with budgetary rights
Local bodies of
regional government
(in raions)
with budgetary rights
Sub-municipal
governments (sub-raion)
with no budgetary rights
Local self-governments
(sub-raion) with
budgetary rights
Local self-
governments (sub-
raion) with budgetary
rights
Local self-
governments (sub-
raion) with no
budgetary rights
⇑
Contradicts
legislation
⇑
Contradicts
legislation
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4. How to count for local governments?
We took a look here at all levels of government that have been in existence in Russia to date. From
what has been discussed one can infer that the “depth” of Russia’s government system is not
homogeneous in that it may vary in particular regions from 2 to 3 levels. In some cases a kind of
local governments may be established even on the 4-th level5.  However the budgetary system of
the Russian Federation provides only for three levels of the budgetary system leaving the regions
with only two of them. Thus, the number of budget levels does not necessarily correspond to the
number of levels of government (at least of the representative branch thereof).
The RF State Statistical Committee reports on about 27,500 different kinds of rural and urban
settlements. In the estimates of the Ministry of Affairs of the Nationalities and Migration there are
about 12,200 municipalities in the Russian Federation today. The figure includes all elected local
bodies of government that are registered by the Ministry in its Register of municipalities. Of these
over 1000 municipalities possess no municipal property. If one calculates how many bodies of local
self-government are assigned budgetary rights and the discretion to levy local taxes (local capacity
to tax being a factor enabling local governments to have full-fledged budgets rather than financial
plan), the resultant figure would be only about 3,500 municipalities (see Table 1). “Poles apart”, as
they say.
Here we recognize that over 8,000 mayors and their governments have been taken away the legal
rights to raise revenues and take decisions on budget expenditures. Strange as it is they do not
complain about this a lot.
5. The foundations of the public power in Russia
Presumably, the above mentioned submissiveness is attributable to that losses of self-sufficiency,
independence, ability to forecast revenues, plan expenditures, etc., resulting from infringements on
budgetary rights granted by the federal legislation to local governments, are in fact negligible, no
matter how appalling such infringements may seem (especially to foreign experts). In other words,
it makes almost no difference whether localities enjoy formal fiscal autonomy or not. Local
governments of either type find themselves controlled in their choices to almost the same extent.
                                                
5 It takes place in regions where on sub-raion level villages are united into “selsoviets” (a kind of a
county). Selsoviets may further be splitted into single villages.
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The difference between the status of localities that enjoy full budgetary rights (provided by the
federal legislation) and those on fixed financial plan appears to be immaterial, there being almost no
distinction between the true local budget and financial plan.
At the same time local governors concentrate enormous informal power. Local governors have the
informal negotiating power to increase their financial plan. Local “tzar” can influence local
companies through threatening them to switch off from water, gas and electricity supply. He also
may accumulate non-tax revenues in off-budget funds and use them independently without nearly
any control. He also can suggest local company to provide direct services to local government
instead of being registered as a taxpayer. The existing budgetary system in Russia provides for
larger informal rather than formal power to local governments, the formal power being miserable
because of the federal limitations imposed on local budgetary rights.
6. Who is accountable for public money going to local level?
In what follows we will prove that there is no actual accountability of local governments for the
public money they collect and spend.  In the current system local governments are assigned with
inadequate revenue raising and public service provision responsibilities.
6.1. Revenue assignments across  levels of government
As shown earlier, the discussed budgets of different levels of government differ considerably in
alternatives they have to determine amounts of revenues available to them and in choices of how
those revenues will be allocated among particular spending categories. Revenue autonomy, i.e. the
power to adopt taxes, is enjoyed (although to a different extent) only by the federal level, level-one
regional governments and level-one local governments.
The tax legislation clearly distinguishes between three types of taxes levied in Russia: federal,
regional and local. A tax is assigned to a particular type only by including it into the list under a
relevant name.
Federal taxes (including rates and what they should apply to as well as payers of taxes) are
established in the legislation of the Russian Federation together with the procedure for payment to
the budget or extra-budgetary funds and levied across all Russia.
Of regional taxes the enterprise property tax and forest fee are established in the legislation of the
Russian Federation and levied across Russia, with rates determined by regional laws. It is notable
that regardless of its rate, the federal legislation causes 50 percent of total collections from the
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enterprise property tax to be dedicated to local budgets in the jurisdiction of taxpayer’s location.
Regional governments may choose to adopt (establish) only the duty for support of education
imposed on natural persons and sales tax (with rates to be established within the range defined in
the federal legislation). Upon introduction of the sales tax the duty for support of education is to be
repealed. Strictly speaking, enterprise profits tax should also be classed among regional taxes to the
extent that it goes to regional budgets as regions may levy any regional rate up to the centrally
prescribed statutory limit.
Of local taxes (see Table 2) three taxes: personal property tax, land tax and registration fee on
individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activities are established in the federal legislation and apply
throughout Russia. The Federation also establishes what shares of the land tax would be distributed
to the federal, regional and local governments through the requirement for concentration of part of
the revenue in regional (20 percent) and federal (30 percent) budgets.
However, until recently (before the introduction of the sales tax that has repealed the overwhelming
majority of local taxes) localities did have, even if very limited, law-making power in that they
could choose the tax base for, and rate to be levied on, six taxes (of which two can be levied only in
health resort zones). Those taxes were:
1. Tax on construction of manufacturing facilities in health resort areas;
2. Health resort fee;
3. Fee for parking of motor vehicles;
4. Fee for the right to shoot movies and telefilms;
5. Fee for setting up gambling business;
6. Fee for territory cleaning in populated areas.
It should be pointed out that the first four fees being in effect user fees, the last one, despite a
similar name is sort of an earmarked fee. We call it “sort of” because in the absence of targeted
budgetary funds at the local level it is impossible to track down spending of revenues received from
particular sources. Hence, the fee for territory cleaning is the only independent source of revenue
for local budgets. In a number of municipalities it indeed was a significant source of revenue, its
contribution to local budgets amounting to 15 – 20 percent of total tax collections. For example, in
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Omsk City that could not expect any significant aid from the region the fee was set at 2 percent of
the turnover. In Lipetsk City it was 1.5 percent of the turnover.
After the introduction of the sales tax localities have the discretion to adopt the base and rate for
only the health resort fee (although by far not all Russian localities are in health resort areas to take
advantage of their right).
Thus, budgetary rights of local governments to adopt taxes are extremely limited and dwindle year
by year (see Table 3), becoming practically indistinguishable from budgetary rights enjoyed by
administrative-territorial entities that are devoid of taxing power. That is why even regional
authorities not always realize the existence of the earlier described differences between levels of the
budget system, in particular the differences between levels of local budgets, and give a very loose
interpretation to the term “municipality” converting cities and towns below the regional level
alternately to budgets and fixed financial plan. In any case this explains why estimates of the
number of existing administrative-territorial entities at the local level in Russia differ.
6.2. Expenditure assignments across levels of government
Regional governments in Russia often look upon local budgets as expense budgets (or fixed
financial plan) of administrative-territorial entities, with very detailed expenditure norms developed
at the regional level, including in areas that are considered to be the responsibility of local
governments. Thus, spending options and total amounts available to localities are heavily controlled
by the federal and regional legislation. Federal and regional mandates and higher-level expenditure
norms leave little, if any, room for real alternatives to localities. Restrictions of local rights to
change the type of, liquidate or privatize social assets have the same effect.
At present most of spending norms provided by federal ministries for lower-level governments are
developed as recommendations and are usually physical standards6. For example, the federal
standard for cost of delivery of housing and public utility services per 1 m2 of total dwelling space
set out in the “Concept of Reform of Housing and Utilities Sector in the Russian Federation”7
cannot be considered a compulsory federal norm for lower level budgets. The Concept emphasizes
that the given standard shall be used only “for distribution of federal budget funds among subjects
                                                
6 See Direction of the RF Government N 1063-r dated July 3, 1996.
7 As approved by Russian President’s Decree N 425 of April 28, 1997.
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of the Russian Federation”. Therein established indicator of the ratio between coverage of H&U
costs by households and the level of costs of H&U service delivery is not a compulsory norm either
to be adhered to without fail by lower level budgets and is provided only for calculation of transfers.
As regards the federal expenditure norm for education mentioned in the Federal Law on Education
N 12-FZ of January 13, 1996, no straightforward conclusion can be drawn therefrom, whether the
federal norms are “minimum permissible” norms for all levels of budgets or only for federal
educational establishments8.
Until recently the said norms were used primarily for calculation of the so-called “justified level of
fiscal sufficiency” for the distribution of funds from higher-level budgets. However, financial
resources received by regions were barely sufficient to support social infrastructure inherited from
the pre-reform period. Strapped for financial resources, regions were incapable of increasing
expenditures on maintenance of the existing infrastructure to over federal norms. Therefore, in
drafting their own budgets regions were interested in using federal norms as a bench-mark to justify
a resulting non-supportable deficit and claim an additional financial aid from the federal budget.
Often recommended federal norms constitute the basis for regional norms mandated by the regional
legislation9.
                                                
8 Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 41 of the Law read as follows:
“2. Financing of educational establishments shall be on the basis of state (including departmental)
and local financing norms calculated per student, or pupil for each type, kind and category of
educational establishments.
3. Federal norms of financing educational establishments shall be prescribed annually in the federal
law passed simultaneously with the federal budget law for a respective year and are minimum
permissible norms.
4. Regional and local norms of financing shall take into account specific features of an educational
establishment and be sufficient for coverage of locality’s average operating expenditures related to
education process and use of buildings, structures and standard equipment of an educational
establishment”.
9 For example, see the Law on the Budget System of Moscow Oblast, whereby localities are obliged
to adhere to around 60 expenditure norms.
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The most important of all effective norms adopted at the federal level by the Russian Government is
a “Uniform Schedule of Rates of Wage Payments to Budget Sector Employees”10. Budget sector
employees include employees of all agencies financed from a budget of any level, including local
budgets, except for employees of government administrations.
In addition to wage norms per budget employee federal authorities keep under control the number
of employees in budget organizations. They do it indirectly, by establishing standards of public
service delivery. However, rather than referring to quality or quantity level of service delivery (e.g.
quality of education received by students or number of students) those standards have to do with
cost indicators (number of teaching hours for particular school subjects, time to be spent in a
hospital with a particular disease, etc.). Localities are in effect obliged to comply not only with
specific wage norms but also with the total size of the wage fund for budget employees accounting
for about 25 percent of total budget expenditures.
Regional and local governments are subject to even more stringent constraints imposed on their
spending decisions and total spending by federal laws on entitlements and social benefits to specific
population groups.
The “Concept of Reform of Housing and Utilities Sector in the Russian Federation” constrains local
spending choices by imposing a fairly rigid requirement to fix a “maximum allowable share of
households’ own expenditures on payment for housing and public utility services in a combined
household income”. Local budgets are thus mandated to subsidize costs of housing and communal
services for low-income individuals.
These entitlements and subsidies for certain segments of the population11 are prescribed in more
than 120 federal legislative acts of which 45 were passed prior to 1992 but are still in effect. Local
                                                
10 See RF Government Regulations N 785 of October 14, 1992 about Differentiation of Levels of
Wages of Budget Sector Employees on the Basis of the Uniform Schedule of Rates and N 823 of
August 24, 1995 on Increase of Rates (Wages) of the Uniform Schedule of Rates of Wage Payments
to Budget Sector Employees, as amended and supplemented.
11 «A certain segment» may include fairly broad groups of the population. For example, August 6,
1992 Resolution N 2464-1 of the RF Supreme Council on Introducing Order into Payment for
Services of Pre-school Institutions and Financial Support to the System of Such Institutions”
stipulates that “as of April 1, 1992 the rate of payment charged to parents shall not exceed 20
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governments are required to subsidize 37 types of benefits. For some of them the number of eligible
classes of individuals reaches 15.
The federal legislation from the onset encumbered local budgets with payment of most of the
above-mentioned subsidies and benefits. It is estimated that for the majority of local budgets
expenditure needs for covering those mandates exceed all of their revenues, including transfers.
The Law on Financial Foundations of Local Self-government provides that “bodies of local self-
government shall be entitled to fulfil decisions of bodies of state power resulting in loss of revenues
or increase of expenditures within funds transferred to them by way of compensation”. However,
more often than not local governments fail to prove that funds transferred to them “by way of
compensation” are insufficient, because strictly speaking it can be proven only if funds were
transferred for the designated purpose. In practice the amount of funds required for compensation is
just "taken into account” in establishing sharing rates of regulating taxes or calculating total grants.
Thus, when payments of subsidies or benefits fail to be made eligible individuals sue the
responsible local government to receive the entitled benefit, with most of such cases lost by local
governments.
7. Policy recommendations:
Principles of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
In what follows we will analyze how the problem of building intergovernmental fiscal relations at
the sub-federal level is addressed in the federal legislation and what kind of reasoning can be
brought forward from an economic rationale standpoint for encouraging subjects of the Federation
to build stable, transparent and efficient fiscal relations in regions.
7.1. Equality of budgetary rights of all counterparts in intergovernmental fiscal relations on sub-
national level
Right now the federal legislation establishing the foundations of fiscal relations between regional
and municipal authorities has to do with relationships between regional government and one level
of local governments. Therewith it allows for the establishment of local governments at any
                                                                                                                                                                 
percent of costs of care provided to children in a given institution”. Hence, the overwhelming
majority of the population falls into the eligible class entitled to this benefit. Until recently monthly
child benefits have also been paid indiscriminately.
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territorial level. A list of local budgets that will play the role of regional government’s partners in
intergovernmental fiscal relations shall be put together by bodies of state power of the region
(Federation Subject).
However, a fairly large number of regions have more than one level of local governments. As
discussed earlier, different Russian regions use different models for establishing local bodies of
government in accordance with priorities and traditions supported by the subject of the Federation.
The principle by which municipal settlements enjoy equal budgetary rights in the context of their
fiscal relations with regional governments12 implies that whatever are the territories acting as
region’s counterparts in intergovernmental fiscal relations, they shall be given equal rights to
introduce local taxes, choose tax bases and rates to be levied, and equal borrowing power and rights
to adjust the level of their spending and receive grants from the regional budget. The federal
legislation provides no straightforward guide to whether equal rights shall be given to any territory
where the residency opted for establishment of local self-government or whether the right to class a
territory administered by local self-government as a municipality and an equal participant in
intergovernmental fiscal relations shall be vested in a region. Clearly, the federal legislation in this
field needs to be amended and supplemented but regardless of the answer to the above question,
there are certain arguments for or against fiscal decentralization that shall be taken into account in
selecting an organizational structure of a sub-federal government.
First, subdividing local governments will work for diminishing the scope of issues handled locally,
enhance the need for centralization of revenues in the regional budget and weaken local
governments as institutions13. A subject of the Federation won’t only have to assume the
                                                
12 See the Concept of Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the RF in 1999 and for a
Period up to the Year 2000, and Budget Code.
13 In Tyumen Oblast as a result of change-over to the sub-rayon principle of the organization of
local self-government the share of expenditures financed from local budgets dropped from 59 to 45
percent. The reason why it happened is because many social assets that used to be funded from
rayon budgets (for example rayon hospitals) had to be assumed by the oblast as small municipalities
are unable to and should not finance such facilities providing services to the citizenry of many
municipal settlements. A possible alternative to funding of such facilities from regional budgets
may be municipal associations set up for maintenance of the said assets within the boundaries of
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responsibility for performance of many functions theretofore performed locally but also regulate
fiscal relations with a larger number of municipalities, which is no small a task, when one has to
deal with hundreds of small municipalities.
Second, the smaller the size and the lesser the diversification of local economy the greater the risk
of loss of local budget revenues as a result of economic problems occurring in the course of budget
execution, such losses being unrecoverable to local governments.
Third, a choice of candidate territory for granting independent budgetary rights shall be guided by
considerations of efficiency in delivery of governmental services to the public. Clearly, a candidate
territory with a broad tax base will be able to spend more per capita in provision of services to their
residents as a result of a spin-off, but this will hamper access to public services for citizens of
neighboring territories with a narrower tax base.
Fourth, the efficiency of service delivery is a function of expertise and skills of the personnel
available in localities. Lack of skillful experts in management of government finances, budget
planning and accounting creates a danger of that local budgets will be planned and executed
inefficiently.
Fifth, bodies of state power shall be given access to sources of information independent of local
governments to obtain data on the size of economy (tax base) and expenditure needs of municipal
settlements. If that is a problem, regions will hardly be able to ensure fair distribution of regional
budget funds among localities. Bodies of state power of a Federation subject shall keep that in mind
when deciding on to which levels of budgets they will distribute funds for fiscal regulation.
The importance of the above factor will be a function of a share of fiscal regulation funds in total
revenues of local budgets. Where it is small, i.e. if the budget system is vertically balanced,
availability or lack of objective statistical data on revenue potential and expenditure needs of local
budgets won’t be of critical importance for deciding on which territorial level should participate in
intergovernmental fiscal relations. But where it is great, availability of data imposes significant
constraints on subject’s counterparts in intergovernmental fiscal regulation.
                                                                                                                                                                 
former rayons, but as municipalities will have to jointly fund the expenditures it will be difficult for
them to come to a consensus on establishment of such associations. Regions will have to step in to
delineate financing responsibilities among municipalities, thereby limiting their fiscal autonomy.
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For a budget system at a sub-federal level to be vertically balanced, local budgets should be allowed
to exercise broader revenue options. This can be accomplished by allowing local governments to
adjust their per capita revenues on their own through introduction of local taxes and choosing rates
at which they will be levied, and through revenue sources assigned to them on a permanent basis for
financing their spending functions. However, those issues only partially fall under the jurisdiction
of sregional governments. For example, a list of local taxes and fees is determined by the federal
legislation. Regional governments are free to assign to localities any revenue sources available to
them but the same bodies of regional governments are responsible for ensuring an appropriate
balance between expenditure needs and revenue options open to localities, this being one of the
forms of intergovernmental fiscal regulation requiring reliable and fairly detailed information on
objects of regulation.
Genuine expansion of revenue autonomy of local budgets lies in the hands of federal authorities. It
is the federal level that can assign adequate taxes to localities on a permanent basis, property taxes
in the first place. It is the federal level that can introduce the so-called “split” rate for personal
income tax, to allow localities to bring real pressure to bear on how much revenue they can raise
and, accordingly, become accountable to their citizenry for the quantity and quality of public
services they provide.
The tax system where every budget level is assigned appropriate taxes will help establish a
vertically balanced budget system and abandon the use of regulating taxes that work against
stability and transparency in intergovernmental fiscal relations.
7.2. Equality of local governments in their fiscal relations with a regional government
The principle of equality of local budgets in their fiscal relations with a regional government
implies that the subject will apply a single methodology to all localities for calculation of the need
for financial aid from a higher level budget. Norms of financial expenditures on delivery of public
services, norms of per capita budget revenues that are key to calculation of the size of financial aid
to localities shall also be determined by a single methodology, subject to social, economic,
geographic and other differences of the municipalities and to total transfers received by localities
from the regional budget by way of distribution of revenues for fiscal regulation.
General financial assistance to local budgets can take the form of transfers or tax sharing. For an
approach to calculating financial assistance to each locality to be objective, transfers and shares of
regulating taxes shall be considered together. Once total amount of financial assistance to be
distributed to each municipality is known, one can decide on a fiscal tool for distribution of
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revenues to localities: sharing rates of regulating taxes or transfers. As the use of sharing
arrangements provides an incentive for local authorities to expand the tax-base and raise more
revenues from their territories, with the benefits derived therefrom also by higher-level
governments, one can recommend that the maximum portion of financial assistance they are entitled
to, be distributed to localities in the form of shares of regulating taxes, with the rest provided in the
form of transfers14.
The provision of the Law on General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-government in
the Russian Federation (Article 6, paragraph 4) whereby bodies of regional government are entitled
to give their powers to local self-governments is sometimes interpreted in a sense that they are
entitled to delegate, inter alia, to raion governments (raion subdivisions of regional administrations)
or governments of level-one municipalities their powers to distribute revenues by way of fiscal
regulation. Presumably, such interpretation is wrong, as it runs counter to the principle of localities’
fiscal equality in dealing with regional governments: while per capita revenues of municipalities are
adjusted by administrations of level-one municipalities, per capita revenue equalization may be
achieved only within the boundaries of their jurisdictions but not for all municipalities within a
region. In keeping with the principle of localities’ fiscal equality in dealing with regional authorities
may delegate to level-one municipalities only the right of physical transfer of revenues for fiscal
regulation in amounts calculated beforehand by a method common to all municipalities across the
board. In this case revenues for fiscal regulation shall be transferred to a level-one municipality in
the form of earmarked subventions to be further distributed to local budgets. In this scenario the
budget of the level-one municipality serves as a transit account, with powers for intergovernmental
fiscal regulation retained by regional authorities.
                                                
14 Although local governments have no formal tax administration rights and are not responsible for
collection of not only federal and regional but even local taxes, in fact they can contribute to higher
collections, including of federal and regional taxes, by bringing influence to bear on tax payers and
by inducing greater collection ardor from tax inspectorates working in their territories. By
increasing collections of regulating taxes to the extent that they are dedicated to local budgets,
localities willy-nilly benefit higher-level governments (except where collections increase through
non-cash offsets). The latter are therefore interested in that all localities retain other than zero shares
of regulating taxes. Where no important local taxes exist, the above practice of exploiting local
authorities will inevitably continue.
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However, the most consistent practice in a period of transition to abandonment of regulating taxes
will be for regional authorities to assign to every municipality uniform rates of taxes that will be
shared. If the result will be too wide a disparity in per capita revenues of municipalities, the system
may be supplemented with a “fraternal” horizontal re-distribution of revenues. In this scenario
“negative” transfers (contributions payable by rich localities to the fiscal equalization fund) shall
not take the form of confiscation, when first uniform rates are set for all municipalities and then rich
municipalities forfeit all that has been collected by them from those uniform rates. Such
arrangement will allow an efficient combination between fiscal sufficiency equalization and
application of uniform sharing rates. It is especially appropriate for Russia where disparity in fiscal
sufficiency (See Table 4) is exceedingly wide.
As regards the process of re-distribution of financial resources among municipalities as a tool of
fiscal regulation, its coherence is totally independent of how many local budgets are full-fledged
participants in intergovernmental fiscal relations at the subject level. Transparency and efficiency of
the process can be ensured through formalization of methods of fiscal equalization and
abandonment of negotiation for agreeing budget figures. The only problem one may face here is
lack of sufficiently detailed information warranting an objective assessment of revenue options and
expenditure needs of small municipalities. But even with this deficiency, it makes no sense to
delegate fiscal regulation powers to “level-one” municipalities as they are also in lack of the
required information. But if regional governments believe, that “down there they know better”, they
may request localities to provide the information that “level-one” municipalities use in decision-
making.
8. Policy recommendations:
Add one more level of budgetary system on the sub-national level
Taking into consideration the above discussed principles of intergovernmental relations on sub-
national level we have come up with the following policy proposal. To make the public finance
system more efficient and transparent and to make government officials accountable for revenue
raising and public services provision it would be reasonable to add another tier to the budgetary
system by introducing the possibility to form one more level of sub-national government with fully
fledged budgetary rights. This would permit to split expenditure responsibilities across all levels of
sub-national governments in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. This would also simplify
the delegation of responsibilities from one level of government to another. It would ensure that each
level of government has the most appropriate expenditure functions assigned to it and has adequate
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revenues to finance these functions. This would eliminate many conflicts that arise when regions try
to organize public governance efficiently.
For this federal legislation should be amended in what concerns the system of elections of local
governments providing to allow for elections to  two tiers of local governments. The expenditure
and revenue assignments across all levels of government should be clarified and revised
accordingly.
9. Conclusion
The diversity of budgetary schemes used at the sub-federal level is an indication of regional quest
for a more rational organization of intra-regional fiscal relations. Although models of organization
of sub-federal governments dictate only the framework of intergovernmental fiscal relations, the
choice of a particular model will drive important parameters of intergovernmental fiscal relations,
such as division of expenditure responsibilities among levels of government, assignment of revenue
sources and needs for distribution of financial assistance. The said diversity also shows that at the
regional level intergovernmental fiscal relations are not confined to relations just between regional
and level-one local budgets. It stands to reason therefore that reforms of intergovernmental fiscal
relations initiated by the Russian Government shall encompass all existing levels of the budget
system and all participants in intergovernmental fiscal relations. Leaving sub-federal and municipal
levels outside the scope of intergovernmental fiscal reform undertaken by the federal government
will jeopardize end-goals of the reform effort. Achieving the ultimate goals of equalization of
minimum fiscal sufficiency with due regard for objective differences in expenditure needs of
territories, creating incentives for localities to develop their tax-bases and raise higher revenues for
their budgets may be feasible only if the reform of fiscal relations between the Federation and
subjects of the Federation is backed by similarly intended reforms at regional and municipal levels.
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Table 1. Types of sub-national governments in Russia
Model I.  Local self-governments in cities and raions (with all municipalities enjoying full-fledged
and equitable budgets)
№ Region Number of local self-
governments with
budgetary rights
№ Region Number of local self-
governments with
budgetary rights
1 Aghinsk-Buryat АО 39 33 Murmansk oblast 17
2 Altai krai 71 34 Nenets АО 11
3 Altai Republic 11 35 Nizhni Novgorod oblast 51
4 Amur oblast 28 36 Novgorod oblast 22
5 Arkhangelsk oblast 26 37 Omsk oblast 33
6 Belgorod oblast 22 38 Orlov oblast 27
7 Buryat Republic 23 39 Perm oblast 40
8 Chita oblast 31 40 Primorski krai 31
9 Chukotski AO 9 41 Republic Marii El 17
10 Chuvash Republic 26 42 Republic Sakha (Yakut) 35
11 Daghestan Republic 52 43 Rostov oblast 55
12 Evenk АО 4 44 Ryazan oblast 29
13 Ingush Republic 45 45 Sakhalin oblast 19
14 Irkutsk oblast 37 46 Samara oblast 37
15 Ivanovo oblast 27 47 Saratov oblast 41
16 Kaliningrad oblast 22 48 Smolensk oblast 27
17 Kaluga oblast 49 49 Sverdlovsk oblast 68
18 Kamchatka oblast 8 50 Taimir АО 4
19 Karelian Republic 19 51 Tambov oblast 30
20 Kemerovo oblast 35 52 The Jewish АО 6
21 Khabarovsk krai 19 53 Tomsk oblast 19
22 Khanti-Mansi АО 23 54 Tula oblast 26
23 Kirov oblast 44 55 Tuva Republic 19
24 Komi Republic 21 56 Tver’ oblast 41
25 Komi-Permyatski АО 7 57 Udmurt Republic 31
26 Koryak АО 5 58 Ulianovsk oblast 24
27 Kostroma oblast 31 59 Ust-Orda Buryat АО 6
28 Krasnodar krai 48 60 Volgograd oblast 39
29 Krasnoyarsk krai 57 61 Vologda oblast 28
30 Leningrad oblast 29 62 Voronezh oblast 34
31 Lipetsk oblast 20 63 Yamalo-Nenets АО 13
32 Magadan oblast 9 64 Yaroslavl’ oblast 19
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Model II. Local governments on a sub-raion level
№ Region Number of local
self-governments
with budgetary
rights
1 Khakass Republic 96
2 Orenburg oblast 578
3 Penza oblast 406
4 Stavropol krai 309
5 Tyumen oblast 295
Model III. “Double-layer cake” model of local self-government
№ Region Number of level-I
local self-governments
with budgetary rights
Number of level-II
local self-governments
with budgetary rights
1 Astrakhan oblast* 12 141
2 Bryansk oblast* 38 36
3 Chelyabinck oblast 39 15
4 Moscow oblast 69 7
5 North Ossetian Republic 9 4
6 Pskov oblast 26 2
7 Republic of  Mordovia 25 400
8 Vladimir oblast 15 48
* Territories of  «level-I» municipalities are fully covered by «level-II» municipalities.
Model IV. Local self-governments having no budgetary rights (besides larger cities)
№ Region Number of local self-
governments with
budgetary rights
№ Region Number of local self-
governments with
budgetary rights
1 Adygei Republic 2 6 Kurgan oblast 2
2 Bashkortostan Republic 5 7 Kursk oblast 5
3 Kabardin-Balkar Republic 5 8 Novosibirsk oblast 5
4 Kalmyk Republic 3 9 Tatarstan Republic 7
5 Karachai-Circassian Republic 4
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Source: Survey of financial departments in Federation Subjects carried out by the Center for Fiscal Policy
Table 2. Local taxes and levies, 1999
Tax Tax is
imposed by:
Tax Base is set by: Tax Rate is set by: Payments
go to:
a) Personal property tax* Federal Government
simultaneously for
the entire RF
Federal Government Regional and local
authorities
Local budget
b) Land tax* Federal Government
simultaneously for
the entire RF
Federal Government Regional and local
authorities
Shared among
Federal,
regional and
local levels at
the ratio of 30 :
20 : 50
c) Registration fee on individuals
engaged in entrepreneurial activities
Federal Law
simultaneously for
the entire RF
Regional and local authorities Regional and local
authorities
Local budget
d) Tax on construction of
manufacturing facilities in health resort
areas****
Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
e) Health resort fee Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
f) Fee for the right to engage in trade** Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
g) Earmarked duties .  on individuals
and businesses for the purposes of
support of militia, landscaping and
street cleaning, support of education
and other purposes
Local authorities Federal Government: for
individuals - 12 minimum
monthly wages;
For businesses - minimum
wage multiplied by number of
employees
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 3%
Local budget
h) Advertisement tax Local authorities Federal Government:
Cost of services
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 5%
Local budget
i) Tax on resale of motor  vehicles,
hardware and personal computers**
Local authorities Federal Government:
transaction amount
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 10%
Local budget
j) Charge on dog owners** Local authorities Federal Government:
minimum monthly wages
Local authorities within
federal limits (0 - 14% per
annum)
Local budget
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k) License fee for the right to trade in
wine and vodka products**
Local authorities Federal Government:
minimum monthly wages
Federal Government 2500 -
5000% per day of trade
Local budget
l) License fee for the right to hold local
auctions and lotteries**
Local authorities Federal Government  value of
goods put up for an auction or
an issue amount of lottery
tickets
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 10%
Local budget
m) Fee for issuance of an authorization
to a municipal apartment**
Local authorities Federal Government  minimum
monthly wages
Federal Government 0 - 75% Local budget
n) Fee for parking of motor vehicles** Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
o) Fee for the right to use local
symbols**
Local authorities Federal Government value of
sold products
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 0.5%
Local budget
p) Racecourse participation fee** Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
q) Racecourse prize fee** Local authorities Federal Government prize
amount
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 5%
Local budget
r) Charge on individuals participating in
racecourse betting**
Local authorities Federal Government payment
for participation in the game
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 5%
Local budget
s) Fee on exchange transactions ** Local authorities Federal Government
transaction amount
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 1%
Local budget
t) Fee for the right to shoot movies and
TV films **
Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
u) Fee for territory cleaning in
populated areas**
Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
v) Fee for setting up gambling
business**
Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
w) Housing and social infrastructure
maintenance fee**
Local authorities Federal Government volume of
sales
Local authorities within
federal limits 0 - 1.5%
Local budget
* According to the General Part of the Tax Code, as soon as representative branches of regional governments put into
effect Real Estate Tax in their jurisdictions, taxes referred to in a) and b) will cease to be levied.
** Pursuant to the Federal Law No. 150-FX of July 31, 1998 as soon as representative branches of regional governments
put into effect Sales Tax in their jurisdictions, taxes referred to in d), f), i), j), k), l), m), n), o), p), q), r), s), t), u), v) will
cease to be levied.
Composed according Russian tax legislation.
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Table 3. Revenue structure of local budgets across the Russian Federation for 1998
Revenue type RUR in billions  %
Total local revenues, including: 317.5 100.0%
local taxes 44.7 14.1%
Local non-tax revenues w/o sales of property 10.8 3.4%
Revenues assigned to locality on a permanent
basis by the federal legislation
47.0 14.8%
Regulating taxes 132.3 41.7%
Subventions 9.4 2.9%
Funds under mutual settlements 19.8 6.2%
Subsidies and transfers 53.2 16.7%
Sales of property 0.9 0.3%
Borrowings -3.1 -1.0%
Estimated from RF Ministry of Finance data
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Table 4. Range of per capita local and assigned revenues of municipalities in
subjects of the Federation measured by means of Gini index from 1998 data
№ Region  Gini
Index
№ Region  Gini
Index
Russian Federation* 0,23
1 Belgorod oblast 0,18 16 Novosibirsk oblast 0,29
2 Ivanovo oblast 0,19 17 Pskov oblast 0,29
3 Karelian Republic 0,19 18 Smolensk oblast 0,29
4 Chukotski AO 0,20 19 Lipetsk oblast 0,30
5 Kamchatka oblast 0,20 20 Buryat Republic 0,31
6 Marii El Republic 0,23 21 Novgorod oblast 0,32
7 Tula oblast 0,23 22 Amur oblast 0,33
8 Stavropol krai 0,23 23 Leningrad oblast 0,34
9 Ust-Orda Buryat AO 0,23 24 Omsk oblast 0,35
10 Volgograd oblast 0,24 25 Altay Republic 0,37
11 Tver oblast 0,25 26 Astrakhan oblast 0,40
12 Vladimir oblast 0,25 28 Sakha Republic 0,41
13 Saratov oblast 0,27 29 Karachai-Circassian Republic 0,44
14 Republic of Mordovia 0,28 30 Tomsk oblast 0,46
15 Rostov oblast 0,28 31 Ingush Republic 0,48
* variations in per capita regional revenues (without shared taxes and transfers)
within the Russian Federation
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